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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA






SALVADOR DOLLY and )
DOES I-X, ))
Defendants.-)
NuGenEra, Inc., (NuGenEra), a California Corporation, filed
this action alleging infringement of Claims 1 and 2 of its Patent
F6,635,271 (the '271 patent) against defendants Salvador Dolly
(Dolly) and Does I - X. Claims 1 and 2 of the '271 patent encompass
Defendant Dolly's entire genome (the Dolly Genome) and ten
specific gene combinations isolated from Defendant's genome (the P
sequences). Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory and compensatory
relief.
Defendant Dolly seeks summary judgment maintaining that (1)
Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, (2)
the '271 patent is invalid, and (3) the '271 patent is unenforceable for
public policy reasons.' Specifically, Defendant challenges the '271
patent's validity on grounds that it lacks utility and novelty,
comprises subject matter that is not patentable, is statutorily barred
and is obvious. Defendant challenges the '271 patent's
1. These comprise Defendant's affirmative defenses in his Answer. The
pleadings in the case, and other court documents, can be found at
http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3.
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enforceability on the theory that it violates his rights to property,
privacy, and bodily autonomy.
On cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff NuGenEra
argues that Defendant fails to demonstrate invalidity of the '271
patent and that Defendant lacks any proprietary or privacy interest in
the tissues removed from his body or in the patented invention.
This action proceeds under a minute order issued by this court
on October 15, 2001, limiting argument and testimony at the hearing
to Defendant's affirmative defenses.2 Accordingly, the parties do not
argue, nor does this order address, the factual issues of infringement,
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994), or disclosure, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
Having considered the parties' arguments and for the reasons set
forth below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Dolly provided a blood sample to Advanced Genetic
Testing Co. (AGTC) for routine preconception genetic testing on
July 31, 1998. Before providing his sample, Dolly and
representatives from AGTC signed a consent form assuring
confidentiality and limiting disclosure of test results to a designated
physician or genetic counseling service. (See Pl.'s Compl. App. A.)
The consent form did not discuss disposal of Dolly's blood sample
after testing was completed.
NuGenEra purchased Dolly's blood sample from AGTC. At
that time, AGTC disclosed Dolly's signed and witnessed consent
form to NuGenEra. NuGenEra conducted research on Dolly's cells
and found that they are resistant to the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV). (See Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 10.) In vitro and in
vivo experiments demonstrated that certain sequences of Dolly's
genes (the "P" sequences) code for cell products. (See Expert Test.
Noriyuki Kasahara, M.D., Ph.D.) Further, the cells expressing the P
sequences demonstrated partial HIV resistance both in vitro and in
2. The minute order was contrived to facilitate this academic exercise. As
the court advised the parties at the hearing, it would likely have reached the
issues of infringement and enablement at the outset had this patent been the
subject of an actual dispute. The minute order restricted the parties' arguments




transgenic mice.3  Based on these findings, on August 5, 1999,
NuGenEra applied for a patent on the Dolly Genome (Claim 1),
4
gene combination P1-PlO (the P sequences) (Claim 2),5 and an
immortalized cell line comprising the Dolly Genome (Claim 3).
6
Because AGTC had not removed identifying information from
Defendant's sample prior to its transfer, NuGenEra learned that
Defendant was the donor of the HIV-resistant tissues. NuGenEra
notified Dolly of his HIV resistance. After learning of his unusual
genetic traits, Dolly formed a limited partnership, DollyDeal Limited
(DollyDeal). Dolly and DollyDeal sold samples of Dolly's whole
blood samples on November 30 and December 12, 2000 to research
scientists at the University of California and California State
University. On January 28, 2001, Dolly and DollyDeal offered to
sell another whole blood sample to Infants' Hospital. Based on these
actions, Plaintiff NuGenEra maintains that Defendant infringed
Claims .1 and 2 of the '271 patent.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment shall be granted when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party "bears
the initial burden of... identifying those portions of... [the record
that] demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings and by her
3. The expert opinions reflect a lack of consensus on the use of transgenic
mice as an animal model in HIV research. Compare Expert Test. Noriyuki
Kasahara, M.D., Ph.D. (some strains of mice may be infected with HIV for
research purposes) with Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D. (mice are not a
recognized model for the study of HV).
4. Claim 1 is an isolated genetic composition comprising forty-six nucleic
acid sequences derived from each of Dolly's chromosomes. See U.S. Patent
No. F6,635,271 (issued May 28, 2000) at 971.
5. Claim 2 is "[a] combination of isolated nucleic acid sequences...
comprising SEQ ID NOS: P1-PlO." Id. The identity of all nucleotides is
disclosed in the written description of the patent application. See id. at 3.
6. Claim 3 is "[a]n immortalized human cell line comprising the genetic
composition of claim 1." Id. It is not a subject of this action.
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own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial."' Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
A "dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' that is, if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party discharges its burden by conclusively showing that
the nonmoving party has not disclosed the existence of any fact
which is susceptible of an interpretation that might give rise to an
inference supporting the allegations in the complaint. Adickes v. S.H.
Kness & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 n.22 (1970). The court does not
make credibility determinations in considering a motion for summary
judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, it views the
inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. See United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S.
654, 655 (1962).
The same standard is applied by the Federal Circuit. See, e.g.,
Southwall Technologies., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v.
Murata Mach. Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 835-36 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In fact,
summary judgment is frequently awarded in patent actions. See, e.g.,
Wang Lab. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 818 (1997) (granting summary
judgment because prosecution history estoppel precluded finding of
infringement); Mark I Mktg. Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 66
F.3d 285, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996)
(granting summary judgment because patentee was estopped by
prosecution history and Defendant's method did not infiinge patent).
B. Patent Validity
Once issued, patents are presumed to be valid. See 35 U.S.C. §
282 (1994); Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam,
Inc., 694 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir. 1982); Carson Mfg. Co. Inc. v.
Carsonite Int'l Corp. Inc., 686 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1981); E.. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co. Inc., 620 F.2d 1247, 1267
(8th Cir. 1980). A challenging party must offer clear and convincing
evidence to overcome this presumption. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; United
States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance
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Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 560 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); Checkpoint
Sys. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756, 761 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This evidence must demonstrate that
the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") erred in
issuing the patent. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984). When the movant
is the plaintiff-patentee, he must demonstrate validity by a
preponderance of the evidence. See ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac
Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Uniroyal,
Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
To be valid, at least one claim in a patent must meet the
standards of patentability as defined in the Patent Act of 1952, 35
U.S.C. §§100-03, 112. Thus, the claimed invention must have
patentable subject matter, (35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)), 7 have utility (35
U.S.C. § 101),8 be novel (35 U.S.C. § 102(a)), 9 have a nonobvious
nature (35 U.S.C. § 103),1° and be enabling" (35 U.S.C. § 112
(1994)).12 Furthermore, the patented invention must not be
statutorily barred by prior public use or sale. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
7. Patentable subject matter includes a "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
35 U.S.C. § 101. Conversely,
[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been
held not patentable.... Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth
or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter....
Such discoveries are "manifestations of... nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none."
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk v. Kalo
Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)) (citations omitted).
8. Claimed inventions must have a designated use to establish utility. See
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("The threshold of utility is not high: An invention is 'useful' under section
101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit.").
9. Claimed inventions must be novel, Le., distinct from prior art.
Inventions may not be "known or used by others in this... country before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent." 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
10. A claimed invention must embody a significant, nonobvious advance
over prior art to be valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
11. The invention must include a written description that enables others
skilled in the relevant art to practice the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1994).
12. Pursuant to the minute order, the court will not consider issues of
enablement except insofar as they relate to the adequacy of prior art.
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The testimony of expert witnesses in the relevant field may be
admitted by the court to clarify matters of scientific and
technological relevance. See Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161
F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mantech Envtl. Corp. v. Hudson
Envtl. Servs. Inc., 152 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that
extrinsic evidence "always may be admitted by the trial court to
educate itself about the patent and the relevant technology");
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980-81 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) ("The court may, in its discretion, receive extrinsic
evidence.., for the court's understanding of the patent.") (affd, 517
U.S. 371 (1996).
III. DIscussIoN
The parties agree that Dolly and DollyDeal sold and offered to
sell whole blood samples after the '271 patent issued. The parties
raise the following issues: (1) whether the patent is valid; (2) whether
the patent is enforceable over Dolly's property and privacy rights; (3)
whether NuGenEra had legitimate access to Dolly's initial blood
sample from AGTC, and (4) whether the patent was infringed.
Based on the limitations imposed by the minute order, two issues are
now before the court: the validity of Claims 1 and 2 of the '271
patent and the enforceability of the patent over Defendant's property
and privacy rights with respect to his unique genetic make-up as
embodied in his nuclear genome and the P sequences.
13
A. Validity of Patent Claims
Defendant argues the '271 patent is invalid because Claims 1
and 2 lack utility, comprise products of nature that are not patentable
subject matter, are not novel, are obvious, and are statutorily barred
by prior public use. (See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 7-17.) The
court will address these arguments in turn.
1. Utility
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof' may apply to obtain a patent on that
13. Pursuant to the minute order, the issue of alleged infringement was not
addressed at the hearing or in this order.
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invention. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The monopoly of a patent is thus
reserved for those useful inventions that confer a benefit upon
society. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
Accordingly, an invention must demonstrate substantial and specific
utility to be patentable. See id. at 534-35. The utility need not be
commercially viable or wide in application: "[T]he fact that an
invention has only limited utility and is only operable in certain
applications is not ground for finding lack of utility ... "
Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 762 (Fed. Cir.
1984). However, potential utility is not enough. See Brenner, 383
U.S. at 534-35 (invalidating a patent for a steroid because its asserted
utility was speculative, based only on similarity to a compound that
showed activity in inhibiting tumors). Furthermore, usefulness for
research purposes alone does not satisfy the utility requirement. See
id. at 536 (stating that "a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a
reward for the search, but compensation for its successful
conclusion.").
Courts have long debated the appropriate application of Brenner
to define standards for assessing utility in the areas of biotechnology
and genetics. Some lower courts have found the utility requirement
met if an invention has practical "real world" utility or "immediate
value to the public." Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A.
1980). Others have required patent applicants to demonstrate
"substantial or practical utility." Cross v. lizuka, 753 F.2d 1040,
1044 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is axiomatic that an invention cannot be
considered 'useful,' in the sense that a patent can be granted on it,
unless substantial or practical utility for the invention has been
discovered .... ") (citation omitted).
The PTO's 1999 Revised Interim Utility Guidelines applicable
at the time the '271 patent issued required a patent applicant to
demonstrate either a "well-established" utility or a "specific,
substantial and credible" utility. Revised Interim Utility Guidelines
Training Materials 5-8 (1999), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
patents/guides.htm [hereinafter Training Materials]. To satisfy this
standard, the applicant was required to affirmatively assert utility of
the claimed invention in the claims and the supporting written
description. See id. at 5-8. Notations accompanying the 1999
Training Materials express concern that overly generous
interpretations of the utility of gene sequences could hamper
April 2002] 1079
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research, leading to patents based on nonsubstantial utility. See id. at29. 14
In deference to the PTO's expertise in this highly technical area,
and in the absence of binding authority to the contrary, this court will
apply the PTO's 1999 Training Materials to assess utility of the '271
patent. See Cross, 753 F.2d at 1044 n.8 ("[Q]uestions regarding
utility are factual in nature.., and are to be determined in the first
instance by the PTO, the agency with the expertise in this regard");
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[W]ith regard to
questions of fact, we defer to the Agency unless its findings are
"clearly erroneous"). Thus, the court will assess the contested claims
to determine whether they demonstrate "well-established" or
"substantial, specific, and credible" utility. See Training Materials
supra.
a. well-established utility
Well-established utility requires that a person of ordinary skill in
the art will immediately be able to appreciate the invention's asserted
utility. See id; see also Nathan Machin, Prospective Utility. A New
Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent
Act, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 421, 428 (1999).15 Courts have found well-
14. The PTO reported comments that highlighted the limited utility of mere
DNA base sequence data when viewed in the context of relevant case law,
including the following: "Moreover, several comments opined that ESTs
[Expressed Sequence Tags that are useful for mapping gene locations even
when gene function is unknown] are genomic research tools that should be
available for unencumbered research to advance the public good. One
comment stated that asserted utilities for ESTs, such as mapping the genome or
tissue typing, would probably not satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101
if the length of the attached DNA sequence were greatly extended. Other
comments stated that the disclosure of a DNA sequence alone is insufficient to
enable scientists to use ESTs for mapping or tissue typing. Some comments
suggested that PTO examination procedures would result in granting patents
based on nonspecific and insubstantial utilities, contrary to established case
law." Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,441 (Dec. 21,
1999) (citations omitted); See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35 (requiring
disclosure of "specific utility" and of "substantial utility" "where specific
benefit exists in currently available form"); In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1201
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (requiring that a specific and substantial or practical utility for
the invention be disclosed as a condition of meeting the practical utility
requirement of section 101).
15. The rule is the same under the current Guidelines. See Timothy A.
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established utility in devices that were clearly effective in carrying
out identifiable functions, including window fasteners and oil-
drilling equipment. See Elliott Core Drilling Co. v. Smith, 50 F.2d
813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1931) (finding well-established utility in a
commercially successful rotary core drill that did not show sufficient
novelty for patent protection); Edwards v. Dayton Mfg. Co., 257 F.
980, 981-84 (6th Cir. 1918) (finding well-established utility for
highly successful window holding and fastening devices that lacked
new elements). Here, neither Claim 1 nor 2 demonstrates well-
established utility.
Claim 1 - The DOLLY Genome
Plaintiff asserts that Claim 1, which comprises the entire
DOLLY genome, provides the basis for carrying out an accepted,
well-established diagnostic procedure: restriction fragment length
polymorphism ("RFLP") comparison. This method compares a
subject's genome to the Claim 1 baseline sequence to determine a
subject's degree of HIV resistance. Theoretically, as Plaintiff argues,
an entire genome may be used as a probe to determine the degree of
similarity between two individuals' complete genomes. See Charles
D. Laird & Brian J. McCarthy, Magnitude of Interspecific Nucleotide
Sequence Variability in Drosophila, 60 Genetics 303, 314 (1968).
Although the basic methods of RFLP analysis are well-
established, comparing two entire genomes would be impractical
when viewed by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
invention. (See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.) Indeed,
using RFLP as a diagnostic tool is impractical given the present state
of the technology. Whole-genome RFLP comparisons in humans
would be extremely laborious, costly, and limited to comparison with
only one individual genome whose HIV-resistant properties have not
been supported by epidemiological studies. A comparison to DNA
profiling as applied to criminal cases is illustrative. In contrast to the
enormity of analyzing an entire genome of over 30,000 genes, RFLP
for DNA profiling in criminal cases has typically employed a single
DNA site (or "locus") 16 to compare individuals' genetic identity. See
Worrall, The 2001 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines and DNA Patents, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 132 (2001).
16. A "locus" is "[tihe position on a chromosome of a gene or other
chromosome marker; also, the DNA at that position. The use of locus is
sometimes restricted to mean regions of DNA that are expressed." BIOTECH
ApFril 2002] 1081
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Janet C. Hoeffel, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling. Unreliable
Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv.
465, 472-73 (1990). A single specific site or location on a person's
chromosomes has typically been studied for individual variations, or
polymorphisms. To achieve a convincing match, lab protocols
typically repeat the similarity test on the single selected segment of
DNA three or four times. See id. at 473. In civil cases, several loci
may be compared in a more complex analytical procedure. See id.
Such a standard forensic DNA profile costs not less than $1,500. See
Frontline: What Jennifer Saw (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 2,
1997) at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/etc
/faqs.html [hereinafter Frontline]. In comparison, whole-genome
RFLP would require an effort many orders of magnitude greater.
Costs for such a procedure would be both astronomical and
untenable for a "well-established" utility. 7 While it is theoretically
possible to perform an RFLP analysis on a complete genome, the
experience with DNA profiling demonstrates that this use is not
viable. Therefore, RFLP analysis for whole-genome comparison is
not a well-established utility for the Dolly Genome.
Plaintiff further asserts that the Dolly Genome is useful to
maintain a human cell line carrying complete HIV resistance to
infection. The means for sustaining a cell line using isolated DNA
sequences is not immediately apparent to one skilled in the art. See
I. Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult
Mammalian Cells, 385 NATURE 810-13 (1997) (describing cloning of
a sheep through replacement of an entire nucleus, not insertion of
purified, isolated DNA). Because it is not immediately apparent to
one skilled in the art, this asserted use is not a well-established utility
for the Dolly Genome.
LIFE SCIENCE DICTIONARY at http://biotech.icmb.utexas.edu/search/dict-
search.mhtml [hereinafter BioTech Life Science Dictionary].
17. Furthermore, in the DNA profiling field, RFLP methods are being
abandoned in favor of PCR (polymerase chain reaction) methods that provide
effective identifications with smaller fragments of DNA. RFLP methods, even
on gene fragments, have been found to be cumbersome and less reliable. See
Edward J. Imwinkelreid & D. H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 456-60 (2001). The state and direction of the




Defendant argues that Claim 1 lacks utility because its sole
usefulness is to conduct human cloning, which is not legal in this
jurisdiction. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 9-10.) Because such
cloning is illegal, it is clearly not a well-established use. Even if it
were legal, human cloning is not feasible and could not be the basis
of an asserted well-established utility.
Claim 1 thus does not have well-established utility based on its
potential application to RFLP comparison, maintenance of an HIV
resistant cell line, or human cloning.
Claim 2- The "P" Sequences
Claim 2 includes DNA sequences that allegedly confer partial
HIV resistance in vitro and in vivo. Plaintiff maintains the P
sequences are useful diagnostic tools to determine HIV susceptibility
employing RFLP.18 Plaintiff also maintains that the P sequences can
yield useful probes for DNA-DNA comparisons. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp.
Summ. J. at 21.)19
The use of RFLP to compare genetic composition of short
sequences is a well-established application of molecular biology, as
is the use of DNA probes of moderate length. See DAvID F. BETSCH,
DNA FINGERPRINTING IN HuMAN HEALTH AND SoCIETY, http://esg-
www.mit.edu:8001/esgbio/rdna/fingerprint.html. However, there is
no enabling disclosure in the '271 patent as to how the gene
sequences are useful for this technique. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Surm.
J. at 15-16.) Although the '271 patent provides examples of DNA-
DNA comparisons in its written description, such generic examples
are insufficient to demonstrate well-established utility. An invention
is not useful if a practitioner of ordinary skill in the art is unable to
discern how to practice it. See Exparte Deuel, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1360,
1389 (B.P.A. & Interferences 1993) (finding that a purified growth
factor had doubtful utility based on dubious implied utility and a lack
of disclosure on how to use the invention); see also Cross, 753 F.2d
at 1042 n.3 (interpreting the intersection of utility and enablement:
18. The P sequences in Claim 2 likely contain fewer than 100,000 base
pairs. This is a small fraction of the DNA sequence included in a complete
human genome (as in Claim 1), which contains approximately three billion
total base pairs. See HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFORMATION at
http://www.oml.gov/hgmis/faq/faqsl.html.
19. A gene probe is "a biomolecule that is labeled with radioactive isotopes
or with a fluorescent marker that selectively binds to a specific gene so it can
be isolated or identified." BIOTECH LFE SCIENCE DICTIONARY, supra note 16.
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"It is axiomatic that an invention cannot be considered 'useful,' in
the sense that a patent can be granted on it, unless substantial or
practical utility for the invention has been discovered and disclosed
where such utility would not be obvious."). Therefore, under the
PTO Training Materials, Claim 2 has no well-established utility
based on RFLP applications.
Plaintiff further asserts the gene sequences comprising Claim 2
show utility as agents of gene replacement therapy to reduce
likelihood or severity of HIV infection. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J.
at 20.) Although the techniques of gene replacement therapy are
well-established, the success of gene replacement therapy,
sometimes called experimental gene transfer, has historically been
extremely limited. See Vida Foubister, Intense Scrutiny Confronts
Gene Therapy, Amednews.com, (Feb. 28, 2000), at http://www.ama-
assn.orgsci-ubs/amnews/pick__00/pr120228.htm (visited Jan. 27,
2002); Gene Therapy Oversold, 148 ScI. NEws 428 (Dec. 23-30,
1995), at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sciencenews/ (last visited Feb.
20, 2002); Sally Lehrman, Virus Treatment Questioned After Gene
Therapy Death, 401 NATURE 517-18 (1999). (See also Expert Test.
Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.) Unlike RFLP, gene therapy is
experimental, not well-established, based on its limited success to
date. (See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.) Consequently,
Claim 2 cannot be found to have well-established utility based on its
potential application to gene therapy.
b. substantial, specific, and credible utility
Because neither claim can be upheld by a well-established
utility, the validity of the '271 patent depends upon demonstration of
substantial, specific and credible utility. See Training Materials
supra. Claim 1 lacks substantial and specific utility. Claim 1 is
therefore invalid for lack of utility. Claim 2 has substantial, specific,
and credible utility in the diagnosis and treatment of HIV and AIDS.
Claim 2 is therefore not invalid for lack of utility.
i. substantial and specific utility
Substantial and specific utility standards require that the
invention has a particular, demonstrated purpose. See Brenner, 383
U.S. at 593. "Throwaway," "insubstantial," and "nonspecific"
utilities fail this test. See Training Materials supra. However, if a
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compound has credible activity in the treatment of a specific malady,
this effect suffices to establish specific utility. See In re Brana, 51
F.3d at 1565.
Claim 1 - The DOLLY Genome
Plaintiff argues that use of the genome in Claim 1 includes
testing for HIV susceptibility based on the particular type of
resistance that Defendant's cells exemplify. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp.
Summ. J. at 21.) This diagnostic test is similar to testing for selected
genes that indicate increased risk for breast cancer based on specific,
known genes. See Ralph Scully et al., In Search of the Tumour-
Suppressor Functions of BRCA1 and BRCA2, 408 NATURE 429-32
(2000).
Results indicating susceptibility to or presence of a disease can
be helpful in providing proper medical treatments. See Institut
Pasteur and Genetic Sys. Corp. v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186
B.R. 9, 20 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). Likewise, testing for resistance
to or absence of disease can be useful to reassure and diagnose
patients. See id. at 21 (patent awarded for technique that provided a
negative result for HIV infection).
Despite this potential use as a diagnostic tool, as discussed
above, whole-genome RFLP comparisons would be extremely
laborious and costly. (See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.)
Normal forensic DNA profiling using the most simple tests "will not
cost less than $1,500." See Frontline, supra. Whole-genome RFLP
would involve comparisons between thousands of DNA fragments
and result in prohibitively greater costs than those for ordinary DNA
profiling. (See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.) At best,
therefore, whole-genome RFLP analysis as the asserted utility for
Claim 1 skirts the perimeter of insubstantiality.
Plaintiffs vague assertions of utility for the Dolly Genome are
representative of the overly ambitious reach of Claim 1. Plaintiff
has patented the entire DOLLY genome without understanding the
mechanism or even the specific gene sequence that confers HIV
resistance. Plaintiff has thereby monopolized a field that should be
open to aggressive research by the biotechnology community. Such
monopolization is inconsistent with the policy underlying the grant
of a patent:
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a
product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that
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monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It may
engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.
Such a patent may confer power to block off whole areas of
scientific development, without compensating benefit to the
public. The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an
invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process
is refined and developed to this point-where specific
benefit exists in currently available form-there is
insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to
engross what may prove to be a broad field.
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534. Having demonstrated only non-
specific utility for Claim 1, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
"substantial and specific" utility standard.
Claim 2 - The P Sequences
The '271 patent asserts in vitro testing has established that the P
sequences have utility in diagnosis, treatment, and possible
prevention of HIV. Plaintiff relies on In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d 887
(C.C.P.A. 1965), for the proposition that in vitro testing is credible
and provides satisfactory evidence to establish substantial and
specific utility.
Plaintiffs reliance on Isaacs is misplaced. The Isaacs court
determined utility for a known pharmaceutical compound that was a
product of cellular metabolism. Id. at 890-92. This disputed claim is
distinguishable, as it does not involve a known compound. Rather, it
involves a coding gene sequence that manifests resistance through
unknown products and activities.
Nevertheless, the showing of HIV resistance in vivo supports
assertion of actual, credible activity by the P sequences, which in
turn supports a finding of substantial and specific utility for Claim 2.
See In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1567 (finding utility for an anti-tumor
compound based on in vivo studies and expressing "firm conviction
that one who has taught the public that a compound exhibits some
desirable pharmaceutical property in a standard experimental animal
has made a significant and useful contribution to the art, even though
it may eventually appear that the compound is without value in the
treatment in humans.") (citing In re Kimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 953
(C.C.P.A. 1961)). Plaintiff is not required to prove a specific use of
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the claimed invention. See Nelson, 626 F.2d at 856. Nor must the
plaintiff provide details of the mechanism: "an applicant for patent
need not understand the theory of operation of his invention." In re
Storrs, 245 F.2d 474, 478 (C.C.P.A. 1957); see Cross, 753 F.2d at
1042 n.3 ("[I]t is axiomatic that an inventor need not comprehend the
scientific principles on which the practical effectiveness of his
invention rests"); Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) ("[A] 'rigorous correlation' need not be shown in order to
establish practical utility; 'reasonable correlation' suffices."); see
also PTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094
(Jan. 5, 2001) (requiring a minimum of "one specific, substantial and
credible utility"). Thus, based on the stipulated activity of the P
sequences, Plaintiff has met its burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that Claim 2 has substantial and
specific utility. See ZMJ Corp. v. Cariac Resuscitator Corp., 844
F.2d 1576, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
I. credible utility
To satisfy the PTO Guidelines, the asserted claims must also
have credible utility. See Training Materials, supra. A claim has
credible utility if one of ordinary skill in the art would consider the
asserted utility to be reasonable in view of the disclosure and any
other evidence of record (e.g., test data, affidavits, or declarations
from experts in the art, patents, or printed publications) that is
probative of the applicant's assertions. See id. at 5.
Claim I - The Dolly Genome
Because Claim 1 does not have substantial and specific utility, it
cannot satisfy the PTO Guidelines, even if it has credible utility.
Therefore, the court need not reach the credibility of Claim 1.
Claim 2 - The P Sequences
Plaintiff argues that the P sequences provide a credible
diagnostic utility by determining, through RFLP or other DNA
analytical methods, whether other individuals share the claimed
sequence. Even if Defendant expresses a unique mutation shared by
no one else, determining that a test subject does not carry the claimed
sequences would nevertheless provide diagnostic data. While the
value of the Claim 2 sequences may presently be useful only to
establish absence or presence of HIV resistance in a manner similar
to Defendant's, this remains a credible application. Negative results
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are therapeutically useful to the medical care system. See Institut
Pasteur, 186 B.R. at 9 (finding utility in diagnosis that subjects do
not have HIV infection). Furthermore, if others are found to carry
the assertedly protective sequences, use of Claim 2 for diagnostic
tests could lead to the identification of more subjects for future study
of HIV resistance.
Plaintiff has further argued that Claim 2 has credible utility if it
confers in vitro and in vivo HIV resistance. Plaintiff maintains that
the P sequences will be useful for diagnosis and treatment of HIV
and AIDS. (See Def.'s Reply at 7, 8, 10.)
Defendant counters that the P sequences may consist of
"enhancer" genes that do not create cell products but merely regulate
other genes. Defendant further argues that other genes may actually
be responsible for HIV resistance. These arguments are not
persuasive. HIV resistance has been observed based on the presence
of the P sequences. The P sequences have demonstrated three known
effects: increased HIV resistance in (1) one individual's cells, (2) a
hybrid mouse, and (3) in vitro cell culture. Moreover, the parties
have stipulated that the P sequences are coding sequences.
Therefore, Defendant has not met his burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that Claim 2 lacks credible utility. Defendant's
affirmative defense of invalidity due to lack of utility fails.
2. Product of nature
To be valid, a patent must describe an invention that comprises
patentable subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. Patentable subject
matter is construed broadly as "'anything under the sun that is made
by man."' Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)
(quoted in Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. 37 (1951)). The '271
patent presents the interesting question of whether the Dolly Genome
and the P sequences are "made by man" or are products of nature. If
the former, they are patentable subject matter. If the latter, they are
not.
Products of nature are not patentable subject matter since they
are subject to discovery rather than invention. See Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 309. Human input, however, may transform a product of
nature into a human-made product. See id. at 309-10. A biological
product cannot be patented unless it has been sufficiently
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manipulated to cease being "nature's handiwork." Compare
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (holding that genetically engineered
bacterium was patentable subject matter), with Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (holding that
naturally occurring bacteria were not transformed into patentable
subject matter when they were merely isolated from nature).
It is well settled that DNA may be patentable subject matter
rather than a product of nature. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394,
1401-02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (upholding patents for isolated human and
animal prostaglandins); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H K Mulford Co.,
189 F. 95, 104 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (upholding patents for purified
adrenaline isolated from surrounding tissues). In fact, patents have
been awarded for sequenced genes that code for proteins that
function in detecting or treating diseases, including genes associated
with myotonic dystrophy and Machado-Joseph disease. See U.S.
Patent No. 5,977,333 (DNA Sequence Encoding the Myotonic
Dystrophy Gene and Uses Thereof) (issued Nov. 2, 1999),
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parse; U.S. Patent No. 5,840,491
(DNA Sequence Encoding the Machado-Joseph Disease Gene and
Uses Thereof) (issued Nov. 24, 1998), http://patft.uspto.gov/
netacgi/nph-Parse; U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (DNA Sequences
Encoding Erythropoietin) (issued Oct. 27, 1987), http://patft.
uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parse. By isolating pure cultures and
microorganisms, the inventors created a valid claim in a manufacture
that did not occur separately and distinctly in nature. See In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 975-77 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Plaintiff argues that Claims 1 and 2 are products of human
invention because the genetic sequences have been isolated from
nature in a pure form that is altered and useful. Plaintiff further
asserts that removal of the genetic fragments from Defendant's tissue
created a physically transformed product. Although the presence and
character of Defendant's genome is attributable to over three billion
years of evolutionary processes, neither this genome nor the P
sequences exist in a pure, isolated form in nature. The DNA
sequences claimed in the '271 patent derive from nature. However,
they were not in exploitable form until acted upon by the inventor
who contributed human ingenuity and inventorship. Therefore, in
accord with Chakrabarty, the Dolly Genome and the P sequences are
patentable subject matter.
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3. Novelty
A patented invention will not issue unless the invention is novel,
that is, newly invented. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(e), and 102(g).
The novelty requirement both protects and rewards the original
inventors of an innovative device and prevents the grant of a patent
to a device that is not innovative. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2001) ("An invention must be new at the time of
discovery by an original inventor to be patentable.").
Under section 102(a), an invention is not novel if, prior to the
date of invention, it was known or used in public in the United
States. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Defendant argues that providing a
blood sample to AGTC was such an anticipating prior public use of
his genome (Claim 1) and P sequences (Claim 2). Therefore,
Defendant claims as an affirmative defense, that the '271 patent is
invalid for lack of novelty.
Defendant's transfer of his blood sample to AGTC did not
amount to public use. See id. An anticipating prior public use must
utilize the complete product or process as enabled in the invention.
See Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that anticipating prior art must contain "all
of the elements and limitations of the claim... arranged as in the
claim"). Defendant's sale of whole blood did not anticipate the
patented invention-isolated, purified DNA sequences of known
composition. Nor were the tests performed by AGTC on
Defendant's blood an anticipating prior public use. These tests did
not use the Dolly Genome or the P sequences in the isolated forms
claimed in the patent. Defendant has not demonstrated an
anticipating public use of the complete invention described in the
'271 patent. Thus, Defendant has not met his burden of showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the '271 patent is not novel.
4. Statutory bar
Even if an inventor meets the § 102(a) novelty requirement, he
may lose the right to patent his invention under the statutory bar,
§ 102(b), if he unduly delays in filing his patent application. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(b). Under § 102(b), an invention may not be patented
if it is on sale or in public use more than one year prior to the
inventor's date of application. The statutory bar prevents
monopolization of a useful article that had previously been placed in
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the public domain. See Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137
(1877); Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1881).
Therefore, once an invention is for sale or is used in public by the
inventor or by any other party, the statutory period begins running.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The inventor then relinquishes his right to
patent if he fails to apply within one year. See id.
Defendant asserts that the July 31, 1998 use of his blood in
genetic testing by AGTC triggered the one-year statutory period.
Since Plaintiff did not apply for its patent until August 5, 1999, more
than one year later, Defendant contends it is invalid as statutorily
barred.
Defendant is mistaken. The statutory bar does not apply unless
a device was used in substantially identical form as that disclosed in
the patent application.
We conclude, therefore, that the on-sale bar applies when
two conditions are satisfied before the critical date. First,
the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for
sale .... Second, the invention must be ready for
patenting. That condition may be satisfied.., by proof...
that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared
drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were
sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to
practice the invention.
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998); see
Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1986); DeLong Corp. v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d
1135, 1141 (3rd Cir. 1980). The use of Defendant's whole blood for
genetic testing purposes did not amount to public use of the claimed
invention-the genome and isolated gene sequences-and therefore
did not trigger the statutory bar. Defendant has thus failed to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the '271 patent is invalid as
statutorily barred.
5. Nonobviousness
Even if an invention is deemed novel under the § 102 novelty
requirement, it may nonetheless be invalid under § 103 because it is
not novel enough. Where "the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
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invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art," the
invention is obvious and not patentable. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 &
Supp. V 2000).
It is not possible to predict the variations in human DNA. See
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1991). Therefore, based on prior art (i.e., other sequenced
genomes), a person having ordinary skill in the art could not have
anticipated the unique aspects that render parts of Dolly's genome
useful as a diagnostic tool for HIV. Accordingly, obviousness does
not invalidate this patent. See id. at 1206-09 (finding that the
specification of numerous possible DNA segments to code for a
protein did not make their creation obvious). Although it may have
been obvious for Plaintiff to attempt analysis on human genomes to
locate unique activities, this application does not render the '271
patent invalid because research findings are unpredictable. See In re
O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that although
a DNA sequence of gene coding for a monkey protein was disclosed,
the sequence of the human gene and protein chain was neither
obvious nor predictable, even if the area was an obvious target for
research).
Nor is the claimed invention obvious under the "similar
compound" test. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 698 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (holding that claimed new chemical compositions are not
obvious when they exhibit unexpected new properties despite
structural similarities). Genes differ in their functions based on
minor differences in nucleotide sequence. It is unremarkable,
therefore, that the gene sequences claimed in the '271 patent have
similar structures to previously patented gene sequences. Despite
this similarity, the claimed invention demonstrates "unexpected new
properties," i.e. resistance to HIV. See id. Therefore, the invention
claimed in the '271 patent is not obvious.
6. Conclusion as to patent validity
Claim 1 is invalid for lack of utility. Although it is theoretically
possible to conduct whole-genome RFLP analyses to compare
Defendant's genome to that of other individuals, this process would
be impractical, burdensome, and is neither "well-established" nor
"substantial and specific" as a medical diagnostic tool. Revised
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Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,442 (Dec. 21,
1999).
Claim 2 is not invalid as a matter of law. It has substantial,
specific, and credible utility. It comprises patentable subject matter.
It is novel and is neither obvious nor statutorily barred. Accordingly,
the '271 patent is not invalid. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 ("Each claim of a
patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent
form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other
claims.").
B. Property and Privacy Rights in Genetic Information
In addition to asserting patent invalidity on statutory grounds,
Defendant claims the patent on his genome and sequenced genes
infringes his constitutional rights in property and privacy.20 Courts
have addressed the nature and extent of these rights outside the
context of patents on human genomes. However, the precise issues
raised in this case are matters of first impression. Defendant
therefore asks this Court to apply analogous precedent to decide that
the '271 patent violates public policy and is therefore unenforceable.
The proper role of the courts in extending public policy into the
area of human genetics and patent law bears careful contemplation.
With due consideration of judicial constraints, the court turns to an
examination of the enforceability of the '271 patent in light of
constitutional and legislative protections of Defendant's property and
privacy rights.
1. Property rights
Defendant asserts that enforcing Plaintiff's patent would violate
his property right in his own body and its biological by-products. He
also claims he did not consent to the transfer of his blood sample to
Plaintiff and was not given an opportunity to grant or withhold
consent.
These claims are familiar to anyone following the ongoing
debate over genetic property rights. However, this is not a debate the
court can readily join. Defendant's property rights, if any, must be
20. The parties raised additional arguments relating to tort and breach of
contract. However, these arguments were not supported by sufficient authority
to warrant consideration.
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found under California law, since there is no federal statute on point,
nor does the Constitution recognize any relevant property interests.
See Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
("Property interests.., are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."). Accordingly, the court is not free to
declare new property interests in genetic material, no matter how
inviting the proposition.
a. ownership of Defendant's blood sample and informed consent
The '271 patent is based on research from Defendant's genome,
which in turn was isolated from blood samples Defendant supplied to
AGTC. Defendant claims he retains a property interest in these
samples which is undermined by enforcement of the '271 patent
against him. Contrary to Defendant's claims, precedent does not
recognize retention of property rights in tissue once it is removed
from the body.
The California Supreme Court has held that a patient does not
have a continuing property right in excised tissue. See Moore v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 141, 793 P.2d 479, 492, 271
Cal. Rptr. 146, 159 (Cal. 1990). Moore underwent a splenectomy
(removal of his spleen) at UCLA Medical Center. See id. After a
successful operation, Moore's physician used the excised tissue and
other biological samples to develop and patent an immortalized cell
line with lucrative medical uses. See id., 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 148-49. Moore sued for conversion, claiming
ownership of his excised cells. See id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 483, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 150. Moore also claimed that his physician breached
his fiduciary duty because he failed to inform Moore, prior to the
operation, of potential financial interests in Moore's tissue samples.
See id. at 125, 793 P.2d at 480, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
The California Supreme Court recognized Moore's cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty, but rejected his claim of
conversion. See id, at 147, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164. It
held that finding a property right in excised tissue, and hence
requiring informed consent regarding its disposal, would put an
undue burden on the medical research community. See id. at 146,
793 P.2d at 495-96, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63. The court was hesitant
to grant property rights in excised tissue because "the laws governing
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such things as human tissues... [and] blood... deal with human
biological materials as objects sui generis, regulating their
disposition to achieve policy goals rather than abandoning them to
the general law of personal property." Id. at 137, 793 P.2d at 489,
271 Cal. Rptr. at 156. Thus, under Moore, Defendant has no
property rights in his blood sample or in the inventions derived
therefrom.
However, current medical and research practices may indicate
emerging recognition of genetic property rights. Many medical
procedures require patients to sign a consent form. This is
particularly common for treatments that result in the excision of
tissue. The consensus in the medical community is that patients
should be able to determine what happens to their excised tissue.
Plaintiff balks at the requirement of consent for its research, yet
current medical practice strongly supports such consent.
In fact, several recent legislative initiatives specifically require
informed consent. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-5 (Michie
2001) (requiring informed and written consent for retention of a
person's genetic information, gene products, or samples for genetic
analysis); Genetic Information Privacy Act, ch. 588, (current version
at 2001 Or. Laws 588 (S.B. 114)) (expanding protection against
genetic testing without specific informed consent); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-93-40 (Law. Co-op. 2001); Patricia (Winnie) Roche et al., The
Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for National Legislation, 37
JuR Imrcs 1, 1 (1996).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that required consent would
impede medical research both because patients would not give
consent and because it would allow donors whose tissues were
collected without consent to sue. These arguments are not
persuasive. As Defendant's expert witness testified, most people
whose consent is requested grant it. (Expert Test. Richard M. Myers,
Ph.D.) Therefore, consent is a small obstacle to the collection of
tissues needed for medical research. Furthermore, legislation barring
actions on tissues collected prior to enactment of a consent
requirement would allow the medical community to continue
research on samples that already exist, while protecting the interests
of future patients. Such legislation is presently being developed in
several states. See, e.g., Genetic Privacy Act, ch. 588, see. 659.700-
659.720, § 6(7), 2001 Or. Laws 588 (S.B. 114) (2001).
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Thus, the Moore court's concern that requiring patient consent
would unduly hamper medical research apparently has not been
borne out. Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-88. However, this court cannot
properly re-examine Moore. The California Supreme Court is the
final arbiter on this state law question. And, the California
legislature has yet to adopt legislation protecting personal property
rights in genetic material. While Defendant raises property issues
that are not without merit, they are not within this court's power to
address.
b. right to procreate
Defendant argues that his blood samples deserve special
protection as property because they have potential for human life.
Relying on California state court precedent, Defendant claims blood
samples and other tissues containing DNA should be afforded the
same level of protection previously granted to gametic material, such
as sperm or fertilized zygotes. See Hecht v. Superior Court,21 16
Cal. App. 4th 836, 850, 20 Cal. Rptr. 275, 283 (1993)
("[R]eproductive material.., is a unique form of 'property"'); see
also Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 93, 851 P.2d 776, 782, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 494, 500 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993), and
cert. dismissed, Baby Boy J v. Johnson, 510 U.S. 938 (1993)
(analogizing fertilized ovum to intellectual property).
However, genetic tissue has never been accorded the status of
"property" in the usual sense of the term. For instance, in Hecht,
"the decedent's interest in his frozen sperm vials, even if not
governed by the general law of personal property, occupies 'an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their
potential for human life."' Hecht, 16 Cal.App. 4th at 846, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 281. Similarly, in Johnson, the court was confronted with
having to resolve parentage as between an egg donor and a host in a
21. The California Supreme Court denied review of this decision and
directed the Reporter of Decisions not to publish the court of appeal 1996
opinion in the Official Reports. (Reported at 1997 Cal. LEXIS 131) However,
this Court may consider the reasoning in the 1993 opinion as it analyzes the
property issues presented in this action. See McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d
1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the federal district court should
consider the California appellate court's construction of a statute




surrogate pregnancy. See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 93, 851 P.2d at 782,
19 Cal. Rptr. at 500. Property rights per se were not implicated in
these cases, and the courts were careful not to imply that they were.
Other courts addressing this question have similarly been
hesitant to extend property rights in reproductive tissues. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (frozen embryos
are neither property nor persons but rather something in between); In
re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1988) (babies are not
property that can be bought and sold). Thus, where courts have
considered the allocation of property rights in potential human life,
they have consistently and properly deferred to the legislative
process.
Furthermore, application of the patented genes to create human
life could only be successful through human cloning. This has never
been achieved. Cloning a human from an isolated human genome
presents a very different "potential for life" than sperm, eggs, and
fertilized embryos possess. Moreover, cloning is currently
prohibited by CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24185-24189 (West
Supp. 2001). Defendant thus essentially requests that all human cells
containing DNA be protected for their potential for human life, based
on an untested and presently illegal method. Therefore, the need for
additional judicial protection is minimal.
Defining the particular kinds of cells that may have the potential
for human life is a broad task, restricted by our current understanding
of science and technology. Due to the frequency with which cells in
hair, skin, and other tissues are shed, it would not be practical to
label all such cells as the private property of their original owners.
This definition "is a matter of high policy for resolution within the
legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and
study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot."
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317. This court therefore declines to
extend the constitutional scope of property to include absolute
ownership of DNA material and defers to Congress and the state
legislatures.
2. Privacy rights
The right to control private genetic information is central to this
action. At present, however, this issue is unsettled by both case law
and legislative directive. Defendant makes several arguments that
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would construe the constitutional right to privacy to include an
individual's right to control the dissemination of his genetic
information. Enforcement of the '271 patent against Dolly would be
in direct tension with this hypothetical right.
The "right to privacy" encompasses two distinct interests. See
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). It embraces both a
general "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" and the "interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions." Id. at 599-600. The former interest is
embodied in the Fourth Amendment,22 and protects "reasonable
expectation[s] of privacy" from governmental snooping. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The latter is found in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). This right,
often characterized as the right to "personhood" and "autonomy," has
been limited by later cases to family relations and procreational
decisions. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
a. right to befreefrom government snooping
"The constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters clearly encompasses medical
information and its confidentiality." Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence
Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). In Norman-
Bloodsaw, a routine employee health examination was extended,
without the employee's knowledge, to sensitive medical and genetic
information, including pregnancy and sickle cell anemia. See id. at
1264-65. The district court had held that because the employee knew
he was undergoing a medical exam, any undisclosed testing was a de
minimus intrusion into his privacy. See id. at 1268-69. The court of
appeal reversed. See id. at 1275. "That one has consented to a
general medical examination does not abolish one's privacy right not
to be tested for intimate, personal matters involving one's health."
Id. at 1270 (relying on Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass 'n, 489
U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (finding that while the taking of a bodily fluid
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
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sample implicates one's privacy interests, "[t]he ensuing chemical
analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further
invasion of the tested employee's privacy interests").
Assuming Defendant retained such an expectation of privacy in
the blood sample he provided to AGTC, he still cannot establish a
constitutional violation. Neither AGTC nor Plaintiff are "state
actors." See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968);
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment proscribes only governmental action, and does
not apply to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected
by a private individual). The only plausible state actor in this case,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), played no part
in acquiring Defendant's genetic information or performing
unauthorized tests. Consequently, despite its subsequent publication
of Defendant's genome, through the issuance of the '271 patent,2 3 the
PTO is not implicated in this privacy claim. Accord Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649, 659 (1980).24
b. right to bodily integrity and autonomy
The constitutionally guaranteed right to bodily integrity and
autonomy is the right to control one's own body. See Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793, 803 n.7 (1997) (citing Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (finding that "[elvery human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body"). Integrity refers to the physical integrity
of the body. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(pumping a suspect's stomach by force was unlawful). It is the right
to be free from unwanted touching, especially in situations where the
invasion creates a substantial risk of injury or death. See Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990)
23. The '271 patent makes public Defendant's genome both by publication
of the full DNA sequence and by the preservation of an immortalized cell line
containing copies of his genetic material.
24. Nor is Plaintiff an agent of the PTO, such as would make Plaintiff a
state actor. In contrast, in Norman-Bloodsaw, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
was operated by state and federal agencies and under contract with the U.S.
Department of Energy. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1264. It was
clearly a state actor bound by the Fourth Amendment.
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(Stevens, J., concurring). Autonomy refers to the right to make
decisions without outside interference. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-54 (1973). Defendant claims both rights are violated by
Plaintiff's enforcement of the '271 patent against him.25
Plaintiff claims that the right to bodily autonomy is simply a
right to be free from physical interference, for example, the right to
refuse medical treatment. This is supported by the Court's
construction of the right in Cruzan. 497 U.S. at 278-79 (recognizing
an individual's right to refuse treatment based on bodily autonomy);
see also Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)
("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.").
The focus of this right, however, lies in control of one's person
and freedom from bodily invasion. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-88
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Defendant wishes to extend this right to
his tissues after they have been voluntarily removed. Such a
construction would go well beyond precedent. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has clarified the scope of the right as protecting a person's
body. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)
(stating that a proper analysis of the right to choose an abortion must
take notice of physical constraints and pain that only the pregnant
woman must bear). The Court has refused, however, to extend the
right as unqualified when not being exercised by the actual
individual in question. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 (upholding
Missouri's imposition of a clear and convincing burden of proof
when third parties institute proceedings to assert a now incompetent
person's wish to refuse treatment). The right to bodily integrity is
therefore confined to the scope of one's corporeal body. See id 278-
79.
While the forcible excision of tissues would be a clear violation
of the right to bodily autonomy, the mere use of materials which are
25. This argument does not suffer from the same state action infirmity as
Defendant's Fourth Amendment claim above. Here, it is the enforcement of
the '271 patent which Defendant contends causes constitutional injury, not the
collection of data by private parties. Enforcement by this court is likely
sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948).
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no longer part of a person is not. Such use does not physically
impact upon the supplier. Defendant's claim to a violation of bodily
autonomy is not supported by constitutional law.
c. right to die
Defendant claims that the patent infringes his right to die. But
there is no such right in the abstract. See Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 735 n.24 (1997) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny
to an asserted constitutional right to die and thereby upholding an
anti-doctor assisted suicide law against a facial challenge). Rather,
where the right is found, it is in the context of the right to refuse
medical treatment, based on either the common-law right to informed
consent or the right to resist bodily invasion. See Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 278-79; Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-11,
at 1362 (2d ed. 1988). Wherever grounded, the liberty interests
implicated in Defendant's case do not rise to a choice between life
and death. Defendant's personal right to die is not affected. See
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. The immortalized cell line in Claim 3 that
Defendant claims is artificially extending his life is factually and
legally distinct from Defendant's person. 2 6 Since the cell line is not
the Defendant's physical being, his personhood is not affected by its
propagation. Nor is Defendant "immortalized" simply because one
of his cells is. See '271 patent, Claim 3 supra note 4. Though
cleverly crafted, Defendant's argument extends the right to bodily
autonomy to absurd extremes.
d. the genetic privacy act
Defendant argues that, under this Court's equity powers, the
'271 patent should be held unenforceable because it violates federal
and state public policy on genetic privacy. Defendant seeks a result
for which there is scant legal support. Some guidance is provided by
the proposed 1996 Genetic Privacy Act (hereinafter the Act). See
Roche et al., supra, at 4.27 This proposal resulted from a study
26. Moreover, Claim 3 of the '271 patent is not challenged.
27. The text of the Act can be found on the U.S. Dept. of Energy's Human
Genome Project Web site. See George J. Annas et al., U.S. Dept. of Energy,
Pub. No. DE-FG02-93ER-61626, The Genetic Privacy Act and Commentary,
(Feb. 28, 1995), at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/resource/privacy/privacyl.html.
This Court notes that the Act is merely proposed and that arguments relying on
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funded by the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of the Human
Genome Project, Office of Energy Research, United States
Department of Energy.28 As the introduction states:
The Genetic Privacy Act is a proposal for federal
legislation. The Act is based on the premise that genetic
information is different from other types of personal
information in ways that require special protection....
Genetic information is powerful and personal. As the
genetic code is deciphered, genetic analysis of DNA will
tell us more and more about a person's likely future,
particularly in terms of physical and mental well-being.
2 9
The proposed Act seeks to "establish rules for the protection of
individual privacy as curiosity about perhaps the most private and
sensitive information-genetic information-is driven by the piece-
by-piece decoding of the genome." Roche et al., supra, at 10. The
Act would supplement the thin protections presently afforded by the
Privacy Act of 197430 by establishing clearer and more uniform
national rules for addressing the collection and use of genetic
information and materials. 3 1 See id. at 5. The Act lays forth strict
requirements for informed consent, detailing the types of research
that may allow disclosure of private genetic information, the
authority needed to do so and the required procedures for handling
genetic material once it is obtained. See id. For instance, section
111 would require written authorization for each disclosure:
Except as provided in section 115 and section 132(b),32 no
person who, in the ordinary course of business, practice of a
profession, or rendering of a service, creates, stores,
it are not ripe.
28. "Additional support was provided by Boston University School of
Public Health." Id.
29. Id.
30. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (concerning disclosure
of confidential information about government employees).
31. The proposed Act would further grant a property right in such materials
to increase patient participation and consent in medical research. See Michael
M.J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Material: Stepping
into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 130-32
(1996).
32. The exceptions are for compulsory service of process and limited access
for statistical purposes in research.
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receives or furnishes private genetic information may by
any means of communication disclose private genetic
information except in accordance with a written
authorization as provided for in section 112.
Id. This section, if enacted as law, might well be implicated by
AGTC's disclosure of information to Plaintiff, or to Plaintiff's patent
application itself.
However, as salutary as these rules may be, neither the Genetic
Privacy Act, nor any similar federal proposal has yet to be enacted
by Congress. In the meantime, genetic privacy remains principally a
state concern. Only a handful of states have passed laws regarding
genetic privacy. Most states that have addressed the issue are still
debating the divergent opinions on these questions, as well as on the
propriety of granting privacy and property rights in human tissue.
See Burk Burnett, Genetic Discrimination: Litigation Required to
Keep Genetic Secrets, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 502 (1997).
Commentators agree that genetic privacy would be best regulated
under federal law, given its national and even global importance.
See Meredith A. Jagutis, Insurer's Access to Genetic Information:
The Call for Comprehensive Federal Legislation, 82 MARQ. L. REV.
429,443-45 (1999).
Pending legislative action, this court cannot apply mere
proposals to limit enforcement of an otherwise valid patent. True,
Plaintiff failed to safeguard Defendant's identity, in possible
contravention of the proposed Act. However, Plaintiff did not
violate any obligations currently imposed by law.
Nor do Plaintiff's actions require this court to exercise its equity
powers to hold the patent unenforceable under the doctrine of
inequitable conduct. As a threshold matter, the doctrine of
inequitable conduct is a defense to a patent applicant's actions before
the PTO during prosecution of the patent. See Aptix Corp. v.
Quickturn Design Sys. Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("In the absence of any showing of misconduct before the PTO,
the... patent remains a presumptively valid grant of personal
property."). Here, the alleged inequitable action, breach of the
confidentiality promised in the signed consent form, was unrelated to
any action before the PTO. Moreover, "the doctrine of unclean
hands [does not] provide a suitable basis for the trial court's
judgment, as this equitable doctrine is not a source of power to
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punish." Id. at 1378. Whatever the reach of the court's equity
powers, they cannot stretch to encompass Defendant's asserted
violation of laws that have not yet been enacted.
3. Court's role in patent disputes
As the above analyses demonstrate, enforcement of the '271
patent may well intrude upon Defendant's legitimate property and
privacy interests. The extent of the intrusion balanced against the
resulting benefit to society is unresolved. Resolution of this issue,
and the resulting decision as to enforceability of patents in genetic
information, will be instrumental to the progress of medical science
and to the protection of our core values. However, the courts are not
the proper forum for this resolution.
The Supreme Court faced a similar issue in Chakrabarty, where
it was asked to deny patentability to new life forms, despite
satisfaction of all statutory patent criteria, because of the grave risks
posed by genetic research. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316-17.
The Court rejected the plea, stating that it was
[W]ithout competence to entertain these arguments-either
to brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the
unknown, or to act on them. The choice we are urged to
make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the
legislative process after the kind of investigation,
examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide
and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of
competing values and interests, which in our democratic
system is the business of elected representatives. Whatever
their validity, the contentions now pressed on us should be
addressed to the political branches of the Government, the
Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.
Id. at 317.
Courts have only limited authority to deny enforcement of
patents on nonstatutory grounds. Historically, a patent could be
invalidated as not useful if it was found to serve an amoral purpose.
See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No.
8568) (holding that a patent had no utility if it was "injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society"). However, as
the judiciary's self-imposed prudential restraints have evolved,
courts have been increasingly unwilling to apply moral judgments to
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patent utility. Today a patent's otherwise valid utility will not be
challenged on morality grounds unless the invention serves no
legitimate purpose. See Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, 185 F.3d 1364,
1368 ("The requirement of 'utility' in patent law is not a directive to
the [PTO] or the courts to serve as arbiters of deceptive trade
practices."). The Federal Circuit expressly noted in Juicy Whip that
decisions to make particular types of inventions unpatentable must
be made by Congress, and that, until such time as Congress makes
that decision, the courts are not free to invalidate patents for lack of
utility based on moral policy decisions. See id. Courts are no longer
in the business of weighing social values to assess a patent's
usefulness. See id.
Similarly, courts should not deny enforcement of an otherwise
valid patent based on judicial weighing of individual rights against
societal needs. The parties' arguments on these issues raise
legitimate concerns. Nevertheless, these arguments cannot influence
the court's analysis of the '271 patent. Deciding the policy issues
underlying enforcement of the patent is beyond the scope of the
court's authority.
The resolution of the issues raised by this case will have far-
reaching implications. The court eagerly adds its voice to the
cacophony of pleas for consideration of these issues by a well-
informed legislature. However, consistent with the proper role of the
judiciary, the court is constrained from doing more. It remains for
the legislature to investigate and decide upon the appropriate
protections to afford human genetic information.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendant's
motion for summary judgment as to Claim 1 of the '271 patent,
DENIES Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Claim 2,
and GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to
Defendant's affirmative defenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 31, 2002
MARILYN HALL PATEL
Chief Judge
United States District Court
Western District of California
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